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This much is not in dispute: Elyse Marie Pahler is
dead and the three then-teenage boys who brutally
choked and stabbed the 15-year-old girl in July 1995 are
now serving 26 years to life in prison.1 Pahler's decom-
posed body was found eight months after the attack,
splayed in a eucalyptus grove in San Luis Obispo
County, California, when one of her killers finally came
forward to police.
2
What remains at issue, however, is whether the
blame for her death should stretch beyond the acknowl-
edged murderers. That issue has recently manifested
itself as a lawsuit filed in California by Pahler's parents
that seeks to hold the so-called "death metal"3 or "speed
metal"4 band Slayer, its members, and the companies in
the recording industry that produce, disseminate, and
market its music, civilly liable for the tragedy.5 Why?
The three boys who killed Pahler, it seems, listened to
the music of Slayer,6 a band once described by The Los
Angeles limes as "giants of new American metal" and
"the favorite group of every bad kid in suburbia," due in
part to its reliance on "violent imagery" and fascination
with evil.7
Of course, the media blame game is nothing new.
Ongoing battles against violence and for control of
media content have tried to shape popular teen culture
for decades.9 Rock music, in particular, has been con-
troversial since its inception in the 1950s.10 In the
1980s, the United States Senate-prompted, in part, by
the urging of Tipper Gore and several fellow wives of
Washington politicians-held hearings regarding lyrics
that allegedly glorified violence and sex.1 Recently, a
spate of lawsuits have sought to hold the artists and
producers of various media products-music,1 2
movies, 13 books,14 video games,15 and even World Wide
Web sites16-accountable for real-world violence and
death. One need only recall the recent finger pointing
after the tragedy at Columbine High School to under-
stand this culture of media blame in which the case of
Pahler v. Slaver 17 is firmly situated.'8
But what makes Pahler so interesting-and in some
ways, unique-is its framing of the legal issues and the
focus of its attack on the entertainment industry. In
particular, the plaintiffs have concentrated their legal
efforts not only on Slayer's music under the usual
wrongful death claim, but also on the marketing and
promotion of that music. Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint alleges that the band's albums have been
targeted at "severely emotionally disturbed adoles-
flim tv
cents"19 who are "ready to explode"20 and subject to "vio-
lent mood swings."21 The amended pleading22 further
asserts that, especially in light of its troubled audience,
Slayer's obscene 23 and harmful 24 music contributes to
the delinquency of minors, 25 encourages minors to break
the law,26 aids and abets criminal activity,2 7 and solicits
the crimes of rape and murder.28 As a result of these
qualities, plaintiffs conclude, Slayer and the recording
industry defendants named in the lawsuit have violated
the California Business and Professions Code's regula-
tions against unlawful and unfair business practices.
29
What's more, the plaintiffs claim that Slayer engaged in
misleading advertising by allegedly holding itself out as
believing in the unlawful and violent activities
described in the lyrics when, in fact, it does not truly
believe in those activities.30 As the plaintiffs put it, the
defendants "espoused these acts to adolescent males so
they could increase their product sales when, in fact,
these individual defendants did not believe what they
professed to believe."31
These alternative theories appear to represent an
effort to plead around the standard First Amendment
32
barriers that California courts have erected to thwart
wrongful death claims against the media based on
either negligence 33 or incitement to violence 34 theo-
ries.35  The case thus ostensibly shifts from First
Amendment concerns regarding censorship of music to
business practice concerns regarding the marketing and
promotion of that music. As Allen Hutkin, an attorney
for the Pahlers, framed the issue in a recent newspaper
interview, "We are not trying to censor this music. We
are basically saying we want to limit access to
minors."
36
As will become clear later in this article, this artful
posturing and pleading is only one type of framing37 the
plaintiffs have engaged in
to divert attention from * * *
First Amendment con- C n t & Law
cerns.38 Nevertheless, by and 0 ot
asserting violations of th ir Ame at
California's unfair compe- th Pn
tition law,39 the plaintiffs' Uer B *1987
seek a number of non- iver'tnJ. (O.er o
monetary remedies that t Colf.), 199, Mceog
would impose restrictions o t1996,
on the band's speech, C Saf
including: 1) injunctive U Membr,
relief imposing "reason-
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able time, place and manner restrictions on the sale and
marketing of Slayer music and merchandise to
minors; '60 2) the imposition of an order mandating that
the defendants engage in a so-called "corrective adver-
tising campaign to undo the harm that Slayer's music
and merchandise has inflicted on California's youth;
41
and 3) injunctive relief preventing the defendants from
engaging in unfair competition and misleading adver-
tising in the future.
42
So far, the creative pleading has not been successful
for the Pahlers. In January 2001, a Superior Court
judge dismissed their Second Amended Complaint.
43
Nonetheless, while the judge agreed that Slayer's music
is protected by the First Amendment, he gave attorneys
for the Pahlers sixty days to file another amended com-
plaint and to introduce specific evidence to bolster their
contention that the marketing of the music caused the
death of Elyse Marie Pahler.44 That's good news for
Hutkin, who remains "confident" that the complaint can




fight it all the way
to the United
States Supreme











of First Amendment protection. 49 The Article ultimate-
ly concludes that the proper solution to the problems
and issues raised by cases like Pahler can be found not
in the creative application (or misapplication) of unique
legal theories to First Amendment issues, but rather in
fighting fire with fire-by implementing aggressive
media literacy programs in the nation's elementary
schools. 50
JOE CAMEL'S NOSE UNDER SLAYER'S MUSICAL TENT:
THE ART OF ALTERNATIVE PLEADING
One of the most controversial media figures of the
late 1980s and the 1990s wasn't a singer or a music
group or, for that matter, even a real person. Instead, it
was a cigarette-promoting cartoon character known as
Joe Camel, who perhaps gained most of his notoriety
after being blamed for causing an increase in underage
smoking in the United States.51 After the Joe Camel
campaign was introduced in the United States in
February 1988, the R. J. Reynolds' Camel cigarette
brand "jumped from three percent to
more than thirteen percent of the mar-
ket in just three years, and among the
youngest groups, the jump was even
larger. '52 It was this latter fact-that
the cartoon seemed to appeal to chil-
dren-that made the campaign so con-
tentious 5
Given the controversy surrounding
the fictional dreaded dromedary, it is
not surprising that the Joe Camel fig-
ure also became the subject of protract-
ed and expensive litigation in
California. 54 In the end, the case of
the Hollywood recording and entertainment industries
in the legal crosshairs of both legislative and judicial
efforts to redefine popular teen culture. The first sec-
tion demonstrates how the theories at issue in Pahler
mirror the tactics used in the recent war against tobac-
co industry advertising that also allegedly targeted
minors.47 Next, the Article situates Pahler within the
context of Congressional hearings in the fall of 2000
that focused attention on the alleged Hollywood mar-
keting of products featuring violent content to minors.
48
It then scrutinizes the Second Amended Complaint in
Pahler to show the types of framing mechanisms vari-
ously used by the plaintiffs to pitch the case within the
context of advertising and to place it outside the scope
Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company 55 played a
pivotal role in the termination of the Joe Camel cam-
paign. 56 Plaintiff Janet C. Mangini, a San Francisco-
based attorney, contended in her lawsuit that the cam-
paign "improperly target[ed] minors, and [sought] to
make cigarette smokers of them."57  This aim, she
alleged, constituted an unlawful and unfair trade prac-
tice under California's Business and Professions Code.5
8
In a landmark 1994 ruling, the California Supreme
Court unanimously allowed Mangini to proceed-
against attacks based on federal legislation preemption
grounds-with her unfair business practices claim that
"the Old Joe Camel advertising campaign target[ed]
minors for the purpose of inducing and increasing their
A
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illegal purchase of cigarettes."59 The high court rea-
soned:
[I]t is unlawful in California to sell cigarettes
to minors or for minors to buy them.
Advertising aimed at such unlawful conduct
would assist vendors in violating the law.
The predicate duty is not to engage in unfair
competition by advertising illegal conduct or
encouraging others to violate the law.
6 0
Of course, by now all of this should sound very famil-
iar. At the heart of the Mangini case lie the same legal
theories now at issue in Pahler. In each case, plaintiff's
theory depends on the same critical components-
namely, that defendants marketed a product that is
unlawful or harmful to minors, and that the marketing
was conducted in such a way that the defendants knew
would attract the attention of a youthful audience. Just
as Janet Mangini focused her attention on the market-
ing of cigarettes to minors, so too have the plaintiffs in
Pahler directed their efforts toward the "intentional
marketing strategy"61 of music that targets adolescent
males. 62 And just as cigarettes are unlawful for minors
to purchase, 63 so too is obscene speech an unlawful
product.
In a nutshell, the Pahler plaintiffs' case boils down to
this: Slayer amounts to Joe Camel, and Slayer's songs
amount to cigarettes. Ironically, there are indeed many
cartoonish aspects to the group's over-the-top morbid
shtick.6 4 Thus, as Joe Camel became the pariah of anti-
tobacco advocates, so stands Slayer-it has been said,
for instance, that "[i]f Slayer didn't exist, anti-rock
forces could have invented the band."65
But Slayer, of course, is not a cartoon character but a
group of citizens, and its product is not tobacco or addic-
tive nicotine but speech. Smoking a cigarette causes
cancer to the smoker. Listening to a Slayer album, how-
ever, does no physical harm to the listener (unless, of
course, the sound level is turned up too loud). It also
does no harm to the overwhelming majority of individu-
als who don't listen to Slayer but who meet or encounter
Slayer fans. The Second Amended Complaint perhaps
implicitly recognizes this fact, failing as it does to name
one individual other than Elyse Marie Pahler who was
killed by Slayer listeners under the influence of the
band's lyrics. Thus, if one wants to compare Slayer's
music to a cigarette, it is clear that those who encounter
Slayer listeners are not like those who encounter smok-
ers. In contrast to the real second-hand smoking effect,
fimtv
there is no second-hand listening effect.
More importantly, there is a fundamental difference
between speech products and non-speech products:
speech products receive First Amendment protection
unless the plaintiff can prove that they somehow fall
outside the scope of its safe harbors. While the Pahlers'
complaint acknowledges this rule, it seeks to circum-
vent it by asserting that Slayer's lyrics constitute
obscene speech 66 that incites violent and unlawful con-
duct, 67 thus invoking two categories of expression that
fall outside the ambit of First Amendment protection.
6 8
In addition, the Pahlers allege a laundry list of penal
code sections that Slayer's music also supposedly vio-
lates69 in order to extract the music from inside the
First Amendment's protective fortress.
7°
The bottom-line comparison between the two cases
appears to be roughly this: same theories applied to dif-
ferent facts packaged similarly.71 In other words, the
success of the attack on Joe Camel under California's
Business and Professions Code has opened up an
avenue of attack which the Pahler lawsuit seeks to fol-
low. The critical difference lies in the fact that while
cigarettes do not constitute speech, Slayer's music
does-no matter how repulsive the ideas it communi-
cates may seem.72 But as the following section sug-
gests, the attack on media marketing present in the
Pahler case has its roots in more than simply the
Mangini litigation. In particular, it also must be con-
textualized within a rising tide of legislative concern
about Hollywood's marketing of violent entertainment.
THE MARKETING OF VIOLENT CONTENT:
FROM THE HOLLYWOOD HILLS TO CAPITOL HILL
David and Lisanne Pahler's attack on the marketing
of graphic media content to minors doesn't stand alone.
In fact, it falls squarely within a political climate that is
increasingly hostile to Hollywood's marketing and pro-
motion practices. Understanding this background
proves essential to the full appreciation of why the
Pahler case provides a representative example of the
new efforts to attack media marketing.
In September 2000, an "unprecedented" meeting
occurred in Washington, D.C. 7 3 Eight Hollywood enter-
tainment executives were called to the nation's capital
to face questions from members of the United States
Senate Commerce Committee.74 The senators, led by
erstwhile presidential aspirant John McCain (R.-Ariz.),
threatened government regulation of the movie indus-
C AY C LVI tLT, P 1).
try if it did not stop the alleged practice of marketing
violent movies to children.75 In response, the Hollywood
executives pledged to limit such activities but refused to
end advertising for violent movies altogether.
76
Even prior to these hearings, Senator Joseph
Lieberman (D.-Conn.), the outspoken critic of
Hollywood and vice-president running mate of Al Gore
in 2000, had teamed up with McCain to propose a law
targeting the marketing of violent content to minors.
77
The not-yet-enacted Media Violence Labeling Act of
2000 would require manufacturers of movies, music,
and video games to label violent content and restrict its
sale to minors.
78
Neither the Commerce Committee hearings nor this
legislation were isolated or random events that year. In
particular, the Senate hearings came in the wake of a
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report issued in early
September 2000 that concluded that the entertainment
industry systematically and relentlessly target-markets
violent content to minors. 79 The massive report entitled
"Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children: A
Review of Self-Regulation and Industry Practices in the
Motion Picture, Music Recording & Electronic Game
Industries,"8 0 provides in relevant part in the Executive
Summary:
Although the motion picture, music recording
and electronic game industries have taken
steps to identify content that may not be
appropriate for children, companies in those
















content. Moreover, children under seventeen
frequently are able to buy tickets to R-rated
movies without being accompanied by an
adult and can easily purchase music record-
ings and electronic games that have a
parental advisory label or are restricted to an
older audience. The practice of pervasive and
aggressive marketing of violent movies,
music and electronic games to children
undermines the credibility of the industries'
ratings and labels.8 '
The report already is being considered by some plain-
tiffs' attorneys as providing the background and ammu-
nition necessary for class-action lawsuits against mem-
bers of the Hollywood entertainment industry based on
their marketing practices.8 2 (Imagine Pahler ratcheted
up to the class-action level against a wider array of
entertainment industry entities.) Unsurprisingly, those
attorneys analogize the possibility of early class-action
suits to the efforts in Mangini attacking the marketing
of cigarettes to minors. As attorney John B. Thompson
of Coral Gables, Florida put it, "This is kind of like the
embryonic days of tobacco litigation. They started out
as individual lawsuits too. 8 3
The FTC's scathing report on Hollywood marketing
practices was followed by an attack from another
administrative agency, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC). In September 2000, William
Kennard, then Chairman of the FCC, said the FCC
would begin to study whether television stations pro-
mote inappropriate content at times when children are
likely to be in the audience.8 4
All of this focus on the marketing of speech products
ultimately trickled down to the 2000 pres-
idential campaign. Al Gore, for instance,
said that he would favor additional regula-
tions of the entertainment industry if it
did not come up with its own plan to
reform marketing practices.8 5 George W.
Bush, during the third televised debate
with Gore, similarly stated, "I don't sup-
port censorship, but I do believe that we
ought to talk plainly to the Hollywood
moguls and people that produce this stuff
and explain the consequences. I think we
need to have rating systems that are
clear. '8 6 During the same debate, Gore ref-
erenced the FTC report described above,
observing that "the Federal Trade Commission pointed
out that some of these entertainment companies have
warned parents that the material is inappropriate for
132
children and they've turned around behind the backs
of the parents and advertised that same adult mate-
rial directly to children. That's an outrage.
87
The most recent assault on the media coming out of
Washington, however, came not
from a candidate, senator, or the
head of a federal administrative
agency charged with regulating
advertising or broadcasting. It
came, instead, from the Surgeon
General, in the form of a January
2001 report entitled, "Youth
Violence: A Report of the Surgeon
General."'8  The report cites the
results of one so-called meta-analy-
sis of media violence as indicating
"clearly that brief exposure to vio-
lent dramatic presentations on tele-
vision or in films causes short-term
increases in the aggressive behavior
of youths, including physical aggressive behavior.
'8 9
Although the report's much-publicized 90 link between
real-life violence and media content is subject to dif-
ferent interpretations and may even be misleading, 91
some of its conclusions and data nonetheless add fuel
to the fire started (or at least fanned) by legislators in
Washington and plaintiffs in cases like Pahler.
What will be ignored by the proponents of restric-
tions on marketing violent media content to minors
are the report's other conclusions that "not all youths
seem to be affected equally by media violence"92 and
that "the impact of violent television, film, and video
games on aggression is moderated by viewers' aggres-
sive characteristics." 93 So too will future plaintiffs
need to convince courts to overlook this information,
as it it suggests that individuals, rather than the
media, bear responsibility for their own conduct.
Even when the influence of media violence is con-
ceded, its overall effect remains impossible to gauge.
As Edward Donnerstein, a social scientist at the
University of California-Santa Barbara who studies
television violence, has observed, "it is very clear that
there are a multitude of factors which contribute to
violent behavior, and they all interact with each
other. There is no single cause, just as there is no sin-
gle cause for any type of behavior we want to exam-
ine."9 4 This fact and the reality that there are multi-
ple variables involved in teen violence, however, rou-
film tv
tinely get swept aside in a political climate hostile to
the media and looking to pin blame on an easy tar-
get.
95
In summary, the Pahler case, with its seemingly
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intensifying that atmosphere, both judges and juries
could potentially be more easily swayed to ignore
First Amendment concerns-or, at least, to relegate
those concerns to the shadows-in cases in which
media content is blamed for real-life violence. 98
With this background of the rising tide of concern
with media marketing in mind, the next part of this
Article returns to the Pahler case to reveal some of
the rhetorical strategies used by the plaintiffs to
frame their case. The Second Amended Complaint, as
well as the comments to the media given by the plain-
tiffs themselves, reveal the efforts to position the case
as one not about the First Amendment (as defendants
would wish),99 but one instead concerned with mar-
keting practices and the protection of children.
FRAMING THE PAHLER CASE: FIRST
AMENDMENT ISSUE? WHAT FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE?
As courtroom advocates for their clients, litigators
must paint the facts at issue in as favorable of a light
as possible and make arguments that sell those facts
and their clients' cases to the triers of fact. This part
of the Article discusses some of the tactics and strate-
gies used by the attorneys in Pahler to do just that.
They are worth analyzing because they reflect the
cultural and political debate today in the United
States about the pros and cons of regulating media
content.
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It's About Instructions, Not Creative Expression
Thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court
observed that it is "often true that one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric."'100 Pahler might be said to put a new
spin on that old maxim. According to the Pahler plain-
tiffs, it's not that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric so
much as it is that one man's lyric is another's instruction.
Indeed, one of the simplest yet most important tactics
used by the plaintiffs' attorneys in the Second Amended
Complaint involves framing Slayer's songs as containing
something other than lyrics. The lyrics, according this
amended pleading, actually constitute "instructions,"'
0 1
"directions,"'1 2 and "directives."'' 0 3  For instance, the
plaintiffs argue that the killers of Elyse Marie Pahler
"were instructed" to commit "atrocities" by the following
words from a Slayer song:
This fucking country's lost its grip. Sub-con-
scious hold begins to slip. The scales of justice
tend to tip. The legal system has no spine. It's
corroding from inside. Slap your hand you'll
do no time. Anyone can be set free on a tech-
nicality. Explain the law again to me.
Murder, mayhem, anarchy now are all done
legally. Mastermind your killing spree.
Unafraid of punishment with a passive gov-
RT,P iD.
ernment there's nothing for you to regret,
nothing to regret. Violence is my passion. I
will never be contained living with aggression
and its everlasting reign.
0 4
Are these words really "instructions" and "directives"
or are they merely descriptions and musings? From the
plaintiffs' perspective, lyrics such as those quoted above
from a song called "Dittohead'' 0 5 are much more than
the descriptions or musings of a group of guys once
described as "a band of Southern California surfers
turned rockers."' 0 6 To plaintiffs, they constitute, vari-
ously and collectively, "instructions [that] include direc-
tions about stalking, mutilation, dismemberment, rape,
torture, cannibalism and necrophilia, as well as rituals
and altars, and the selection of a virgin female as a vic-
tim."107
Another pair of examples illustrates this strategy of
turning lyrics into instructions. From the plaintiffs'
standpoint, the killers acted "consistent with instruc-
tions"'' 0 from a song called "PostMortem" that provides,
as quoted in the Second Amended Complaint: "Entering
a tomb of a corpse yet conceived tighten the tourniquet
around your neck. Sifting away the debris of hated life
cold touch of death begins to chill your spine."'10 9
Plaintiffs also contend that a song called "Tormentor"
"instructed the teenage boys who murdered Elyse Marie
Pahler to terrify their victim before killing her"110 with
the following words:
Running from shadow. Blinded by fear. The
horror of nightfall is ever so near. I slowly
surround you as terror sets in. Are you afraid
of the night? I see the fright in your eyes as
you turn and run. But is your mind playing
tricks on a body so very young? Feeling as if
no one cares the fear runs down your spine.
But I know I'll never rest until I know you're
mine.1 11
Given the plaintiffs' repeated use of the term
"instructions" in the Second Amended Complaint,1 1 2 one
might think that the members of Slayers engaged them-
selves less with the penning of songs than with the
meticulous writing of step-by-step directions, less with
the creation of albums than with the authorship of cook-
books filled with recipes for death. In turn, the mem-
bers of Slayer would not be considered musicians but
instructors-more specifically, instructors engaged in
some bizarre, unholy pedagogy.
For their part, of course, the members of Slayer do
not describe their lyrics as instructions but merely as
descriptions and stories. In a 1990 article published in
The New York Times, Tom Araya, Slayer's singer and
bassist, commented, "I graphically describe a lot of
things-this really happens, this goes on. I'm not
telling people to do it; I'm just telling people what I see,
what I hear, what I know."'113 Similarly, Jeff Hanneman,
a guitarist for Slayer, told a reporter for The Los Angeles
Times back in 1988:
We write these songs that we do because
that's what we like. But they are just sto-
ries-not things we actually do or recom-
mend anyone else go out and do. Take the
song 'Piece by Piece,' about chopping up
somebody. To us, it's like a horror movie. It's
fun because [the songs and movies] shock
you. The kids get into it on the same level we
do. They know it is just a story and just
fun. 114
Music critics agree with the band, arguing like
Hanneman that "the lyrics' bloody scenarios are delib-
erately scary, like horror movies and amusement park
haunted houses." 1 5 Others state the point even more
strongly. For instance, Robert Palmer, former chief rock
critic for The New York Times, writes that the "darkness
flIm tv
in the music holds up a mirror to the darkness in socie-
ty-the empty pieties and alienating double speak of
politicians and self-appointed spiritual guardians. The
best dark metal bands may be anathema in some quar-
ters. But there can be no question of their artistic
intent."
116
So why do the plaintiffs contend otherwise and
attempt to frame the lyrics as instructions? Two rea-
sons appear important. First, one suspects that this
framing is an attempt to circumvent a statement made
by a California appellate court that:
[M]usical lyrics and poetry cannot be con-
strued to contain the requisite 'call to action'
for the elementary reason that they simply
are not intended to be and should not be read
literally on their face, nor judged by a stan-
dard of prose oratory. Reasonable persons
understand musical lyrics and poetic conven-
tions as the figurative expressions that they
are.117
This language is particularly troublesome for the plain-
tiffs' in Pahler because it comes from a decision reject-
ing a wrongful death action against singer Ozzy
Osbourne based on the claim that Osbourne's lyrics
proximately caused a 19-year-old man to commit sui-
cide. The Pahler plaintiffs could answer by claiming
that the children to whom Slayer allegedly targets its
music are neither "reasonable" nor trained in under-
standing "figurative expressions," but rather "severely
emotionally disturbed"'18 drug users. The more effec-
tive claim, however, lies in denying a different section of
the calculus by asserting that what's at issue is not
''musical lyrics and poetic conventions," but rather
instructions-precisely the kind that clearly embody
"calls to action."
A second reason why the Pahler plaintiffs frame the
lyrics in terms of instructions may be to make their case
seem factually similar to an undisputed "instruction"
case, Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.1 9 There, plain-
tiffs brought a wrongful death suit against a publisher
for murders allegedly aided and abetted by a book
called Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent
Contractors.120 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the defendants' motion for summary judgment
based on the First Amendment, and the parties eventu-
ally settled. 121 That ending came as little surprise after
the tone of the Fourth Circuit's opinion:
Paladin's astonishing stipulations, coupled
135
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with the extraordinary comprehensiveness,
detail, and clarity of Hit Man's instructions
for criminal activity and murder in particu-
lar, the boldness of its palpable exhortation to
murder, the alarming power and effective-
ness of its peculiar form of instruction, the
notable absence from its text of the kind of
ideas for the protection of which the First
Amendment exists, and the book's evident
lack of any even arguably legitimate purpose
beyond the promotion and teaching of mur-
der, render this case unique in the law. In at
least these circumstances, we are confident
that the First Amendment does not erect the
absolute bar to the imposition of civil liabili-
ty for which Paladin Press and amici con-
tend.
Of course, as is evident by the court's repeated insis-
tence of the blatant nature of the directive contained in
the book, the speech in that case clearly came solely in
the form of an instruction manual, not a collection of
songs. But to the extent that the Pahler plaintiffs can
brush over the detailed list of qualities that signaled the
former to the Fourth Circuit, and stretch the "circum-
stances" cited by the court to reach the latter, they can
edge closer, at least in theory, to the Paladin result.
If the recent January 2001 hearing provides an indi-
cation of their chances at success, however, the plain-
tiffs remain some distance from such a result. Superior
Court Judge E. Jeffrey Burke did not buy the plaintiffs'
"instructions" framing. Instead, he aligned himself
with the California appellate court quoted above, com-
menting on the nature of Slayer's lyrics as "more
descriptive than directive.' 1 22 Of course, it remains to
be seen whether he will take this position again after
the plaintiffs amend their complaint.
It's About Money, Not Speech
A second tactic in framing the case away from pro-
tected expression appears to involve pitching it as being
about the necessary limits of commerce and capital-
ism-in particular, the need to limit the right to profit
from disturbed children. David Pahler, Elyse's father,
made this clear in an interview with a reporter from
The Washington Post.123 The music industry, he
declared, is "about money. That's the driving force. I
can't imagine the adults in the band, in the distribution
end, really think this so-called music or the lyrics are
good."124
The focus on financial motives clearly links directly
to the plaintiffs' causes of action for unlawful and unfair
business practices, as well as for false advertising.
25
After all, business and advertising center around mak-
ing money, and no one can deny that musical artists
profit from the sales of their cassettes and CDs.
Likewise, the plaintiffs allege that Slayer's "product is
solely a commercial endeavor produced to promote sales
to adolescents who are searching for an identity,'1 26 and
that the group acts "with solely a profit or commercial
purpose.' 2 7 The plaintiffs also point out that Slayer
has "received millions of dollars through the commer-
cial sale" of its albums, lyric books, sheet music, hats,
and T-shirts. 128 The focus on marketing thus frames the
case as one about sales and money, not about artistic
creativity and expression.
It's About Children, Not Speech
The two tactics described above-framing the lyrics
as instructions, and framing the case as being about
money-form only two-thirds of the plaintiffs' legal
strategy in Pahler. The final third, a focus on children,
also plays an important role.
When it comes to restricting the display of sexually
explicit images, or for that matter, any other offensive
or allegedly harmful speech, there is perhaps no more
widely judicially or legislatively accepted justification
than protecting minors. 129 The courts, in fact, some-
times seem to teeter on the verge of adopting what First
Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla calls a "Child's
First Amendment"-a rule of law which permits the
regulation of speech implicating children in ways that
would not be permissible for adults. 130 Yet the Supreme
Court has made it clear that even a compelling interest
in protecting children "does not justify an unnecessarily
broad suppression of speech addressed to adults."'
31
Unsurprisingly then, the Pahler plaintiffs have used
a combination of two tactics to implicate the need to
protect children. The first involves a careful character-
ization of the band's intended audience. Here, the
plaintiffs suggest that Slayer preys upon "severely emo-
tionally disturbed adolescents"'3 2 by marketing its
music primarily to angry teenage males. Next, the sec-
ond tactic outlines the potential harm in such a mar-
keting strategy, citing "a continuing threat to the mem-
bers of the public in that marketing this music to male
adolescents will result in physical, mental, and emo-
tional harm to both male and female adolescents and
members of their families, schools, and the general pub-
lic who are victims of the resultant behavior." 133 Having
followed the pattern of the "Child's First Amendment"
to perfection, the two tactics then intersect in the con-
flation of the mere statement of the issue with the
necessity of the result. Children could be harmed by
Slayer's addressing its lyrics to other children: what
better reason could there be for limiting free speech
than the protection of children?
David Pahler himself summed it all up a bit easier:
"This [case] is about the children. It's not about the
First Amendment."'134 To the extent his attorneys can
convince the courts of that, they can then frame it as
one about the permissibility of restricting children's
access to harmful music. In other words, while a case
involving an attempt to restrict the ability of groups
like Slayer to create their music or to sell it to adults
would be "about the First Amendment," one that mere-
ly aims at restricting the targeting of sales to children
is just "about the children"-never mind that it restricts
speech as well.
It's More than Incitement, It's Obscene
Despite the otherwise absolutist language of the
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First Amendment, 135 a few specific categories of expres-
sion in free speech jurisprudence fall short of being pro-
tected by the Constitution. The two most significant
categories for cases such as Pahler involve incitement to
violence 136 and obscenity.137 While the effort to frame
Slayer's lyrics as instructions seems, in part, geared to
fitting the wrongful death cause of action within the
incitement exception, 138 the effort to frame the lyrics as
obscene is directly linked to the cause of action for
unlawful and unfair business practices.
Although some current legal scholars may argue that
violent expression should be treated as obscenity and
thus outside the ambit of First Amendment protec-
tion, 139 such is not the case today. Accordingly, an argu-
ment based on obscenity remains difficult for the Pahler
plaintiffs to make. To succeed, they must simultane-
ously claim that the same lyrics that are "instructions"
for how to commit murder, rape, and other violent con-
tent 140 also meet the criteria for obscenity defined by the
Supreme Court in Miller v. California. 141 In that case,
the Court created the three-part obscenity test that
remains in effect today and is reflected in the California
obscenity statute. 142 The test asks whether:
(a) 'the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards' would find that
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the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value.
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If all three prongs of the Miller test are met, then any
First Amendment protection for the work in question
dissolves.
When it comes to music, the third prong usually
saves the work from such a fate. Controversy in the
early 1990s surrounding rap group 2 Live Crew's As
Nasty as They Wanna Be album marked the first time
that a federal court of appeals was asked "to apply the
Miller test to a musical composition, which contains
both instrumental music and lyrics."1 44 Although a dis-
trict court judge in that case had previously concluded
the recording Was obscene, 145 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that the
judge, simply by listening to the album and in the face
of expert testimony to the contrary, could not conclude
that the work had no serious artistic value. 146 Perhaps
more importantly, the court wrote in dicta that "we tend
to agree with appellants' contention that because music
possesses inherent artistic value, no work of music
alone may be declared obscene. '147 Even if courts were
to disregard this perfectly plausible assessment, at
least some experts in the field appear ready to come to
the aid of the Pahler defendants-recall the comments
of critic Robert Palmer noted earlier, suggesting that
Slayer's music does indeed possess artistic value.
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None of these appraisals deter the plaintiffs, howev-
er, who doggedly contend that "[t]he fact that this
obscene and harmful matter is in the form of lyrics does
not make it appropriate to market or sell to children."'
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Although the plaintiffs give several samples of lyrics
that they claim are harmful to minors in the Second
Amended Complaint, 50 the obscenity standard requires
that the work be considered as a whole. 15' As a result,
plaintiffs face an uphill battle because the content of an
entire Slayer album, not a snippet from one song, will
need to be considered.
In summary, the Pahler case can be framed in sever-
al different ways, each of which attempts either to skirt
First Amendment concerns or to place the entire case
outside the scope of the First Amendment. California's
Business and Professions Code, coupled with the suc-
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cess in the Mangini case, has given the plaintiffs new
fodder for such framing, allowing them to focus on mar-
keting and advertising. The degree to which the courts
accept that focus might be the deciding factor in the
case. Or to put it another way, how the courts actually
decide the case depends almost entirely on what they
first decide it's actually all about.
CONCLUSION:
No SUCH THING As A MAGIC BULLET
Pahler epitomizes our ongoing culture wars in the
United States. These include not only wars to control
the nature of media content that contributes to teen cul-
ture, but also wars between the generations, with an
older generation attempting to use the legal system to
tell a younger generation that its music is too danger-
ous for its ears.
The case also represents a war over the meaning of
words-how they are meant to be interpreted and how
they should be interpreted. In particular, is it plausible
to suggest that words in song lyrics like Slayer's be
taken as commands for action? If the answer in Pahler
is yes, what are we to make of other lyrics from other
artists? One might wonder, for instance, why pop
singer Britney Spears has not been the target of repeat-
ed physical assaults, given that she sings the words "hit
me, baby, one more time." Could it be that Spears'
words are not to be taken literally? Perhaps the word
"hit" is not actually meant as a command to strike?
Despite the Pahler plaintiffs' repeated insistence that
children cannot be expected to divorce literal meaning
from subtle artistic expression of the sort found in pop-
ular modern music, the lack of violence at Spears' con-
certs suggests that even the over-exposed star's young
fans know not to take some lyrics literally.
Meaning, of course, can never be finally fixed.1 52
Communication researchers long ago rejected what has
been described as the "magic bullet" theory or "hypo-
dermic needle" theory of direct, powerful, and largely
uniform media effects on audience members.' 53 In brief,
the bullet version of the theory held that "[mlessages
only had to be loaded, directed at the target and fired; if
they hit the target audience, then the expected response
would be forthcoming."' 54 Despite this fact, many peo-
ple still believe that media messages can have direct and
powerful effects on an essentially passive audience. 5 5 But
the truth is that people of different experiences, different
ages, and different education may interpret or decode the
same musical message in very different ways. It has been
said, "[Mleaning is at least as much in the culture as in the
message.' 156 Indeed, culture itself can be defined as "the site
where meaning is generated and experienced."'157 In this
light, cases such as Pahler really boil down to efforts to con-
trol meaning and culture through legal channels.
That means that for all of its attempts to frame legal
issues one way or another, Pahler is ultimately about much
more than a family's request for compensation for the trag-
ic death of its daughter or the quest to restrict the market-
ing practices of music that graphically describes sexual vio-
lence. It is about our culture and the efforts to assign both
meaning and legal blame within that culture. It is about
the power-actual or perceived-of speech to influence that
culture and, in turn, to influence actions as well as mean-
ing.
From the perspective of the many thousands of young
Slayer fans who enjoy the group's music and yet never com-
mit murder or rape, the case amounts to an even more spe-
cific question. Should the right to purchase and listen to
such music be limited because of the unfortunate, aberra-
tional actions of three drug-abusing teens? Parsed differ-
ently, should the right of the vast majority of individuals to
receive speech be sacrificed by one random act of violence?
Given the potentially vast implications of the question,
more than just Slayer fans might be inclined to respond
negatively-that Elyse Marie Pahler's death, although
tragic, should not be the grounds for sacrificing the rights of
others.
After all, even if Pahler is framed as a case about mar-
keting, it remains a case about the marketing of speech,
rather than cigarettes or assault rifles or other dangerous
instrumentalities. If Slayer's music really is obscene or
child pornographic, 15 or if it constitutes an incitement to
violence, then its First Amendment protection disappears
and regulation is permissible. But if it does not fit within
these categories, then free speech concerns will always be
present, no matter how artfully pleaded the case.
Nevertheless, this Article has described current
Congressional fixation with the target-marketing of speech
products to minors. This fixation, in turn, suggests a polit-
ical culture primed to use Pahler, should it prove successful
for the plaintiffs, as an entree for increased media regula-
tion. The slippery slope will not be far away if the plaintiffs
are to succeed. Perhaps songs that mention illicit drug use
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in a positive light will be restricted from sale to young audi-
ences under the premise that drug use is illegal, and that
the songs, in turn, cause teens to engage in such illegal con-
duct. As in Pahler, such a premise assumes very powerful
media effects upon a relatively passive audience. Moreover,
it assumes that other factors, such as parents, peers, and
characteristics of the listener, don't contribute to the deci-
sion to use drugs. No wonder they call it a magic bullet.
But just as we must stop subscribing to a magic bul-
let theory of mass communication, so too must we stop
looking for a magic bullet answer to societal problems of
youth violence. Restricting access to speech will not
change our culture of violence, but will only result in a
culture that fears speech. Instead, we would be wise to
remember the words of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v.
California, 159 words that remain as applicable and rele-
vant today as they were more than seventy years ago
when they were first penned: "Fear of serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women." 16
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Groups like Slayer may well be the witches of the 21st
century; we should take care that in fearing them we
don't burn our First Amendment rights.
Rather, if we are truly concerned about the influence
of media messages on children, then we must make
media literacy programs a staple of elementary school
education. Just as children are taught how to read and
write, so too must they be taught how to decipher media
messages, how to understand that songs are just songs
and not commands for action, and how to understand
the difference between reality and the fantasy worlds in
television shows or on CDs.
Of course, in the end, we will never be able to prevent a few
teenagers like those who murdered Elyse Marie Pahler case
from killing, no matter what path we take. Denying access
to music like Slayer's or t eaching media literacy in schools
will not put an end to juvenile delinquency, and we should not
delude ourselves by thinking that some other solution, as of
yet undiscovered, will succeed where all others fail. Just as
music does not control individuals, society's efforts-in legis-
latures, courtrooms, and classrooms-to prevent tragedies
will not eliminate them. But perhaps more importantly, in
taking steps to alleviate what we cannot eliminate, we should
seek to avoid those magic bullets that offer only more prob-
lems wrapped in the guise of easy answers.
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